Hemispheric Differences in the Recognition of Environmental Sounds by Gonza´lez, Julio & McLennan, Conor T.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology Department
11-25-2008
Hemispheric Differences in the Recognition of
Environmental Sounds
Julio Gonza´lez
Universitat Jaume I de Castellon
Conor T. McLennan
Cleveland State University, c.mclennan@csuohio.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clpsych_facpub
Part of the Speech and Hearing Science Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Publisher's Statement
(c) 2009 SAGE Publications
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
González, J., & McLennan, C. T. (2009). Hemispheric differences in the recognition of environmental sounds. Psychological Science,
20(7), 887-894. doi:10.1111/psci.2009.20.issue-7
Research Article
Hemispheric Differences in the
Recognition of Environmental
Sounds
Julio Gonza´lez1 and Conor T. McLennan2
1University Jaume I and 2Cleveland State University
ABSTRACT—Recent work has found support for two dis
sociable and parallel neural subsystems underlying object
and shape recognition in the visual domain: an abstract
category subsystem that operates more effectively in the
left cerebral hemisphere than in the right, and a specific
exemplar subsystem that operates more effectively in the
right hemisphere than in the left. Evidence of this asym
metry has been observed for linguistic stimuli (words,
pseudoword forms) and nonlinguistic stimuli (objects). In
the auditory domain, we previously found hemispheric
asymmetries in priming effects using linguistic stimuli
(spoken words). In the present study, we conducted four
long term repetition priming experiments to investigate
whether such hemispheric asymmetries would be observed
for nonlinguistic auditory stimuli (environmental sounds)
as well. The results support the dissociable subsystems
theory. Specificity effects were obtained when sounds were
presented to the left ear (right hemisphere), but not when
sounds were presented to the right ear (left hemisphere).
Theoretical implications are discussed.
There is an ongoing debate concerning the nature of the repre
sentations involved in object recognition in the visual domain.
Marsolek and his colleagues hypothesize the existence of two
dissociable and parallel neural subsystems: The abstract cate
gory subsystem operates more effectively in the left than in the
right hemisphere and is less sensitive to specific surface char
acteristics of stimuli, and the specific exemplar subsystem oper
ates more effectively in the right than in the left hemisphere and
is more sensitive to specific stimulus characteristics (Marsolek,
1999; Marsolek & Burgund, 2008). This theory would explain
the apparent dilemma of why two objects (e.g., two different
exemplars of pianos) are recognized as belonging to the same
abstract category, but also to different specific categories.
The dissociable subsystems framework challenges other
contemporary object recognition theories proposing a single
and undifferentiated object recognition system. These theories
differ in whether this single system relies on relatively abstract
representations (Biederman, 1987; Hayworth & Biederman,
2006;Wagemans, VanGool, & Lamote, 1996), relatively specific
representations (Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Tarr, Williams,
Hayward, & Gauthier, 1998), or both abstract and specific
representations on a continuum (Farah, 1992; Hayward &
Williams, 2000).
Behavioral evidence for two dissociable subsystems has been
found in the recognition of objects, words, pseudoword forms,
and letterlike forms (but see Koivisto, 1995; for a review, see
Marsolek, 2003). Other data from neuropsychology (Beeri, Vakil,
Adonsky, & Levenkron, 2004; Farah, 1991), electrophysiology
(Pickering & Schweinberger, 2003), and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (Koutstaal et al., 2001) are consistent with the
dissociable subsystems account. Neurocomputational simula
tions show that abstract and specific categorizations are per
formed more effectively by a dual subsystems model than by a
single system model, particularly when abstract categories in
clude both similar and dissimilar exemplars (see Marsolek,
2003).
The strongest support for the dissociable subsystems theory
comes from studies using the long term repetition priming par
adigm. In this paradigm, priming (enhancement of performance)
due to repetition of a stimulus may be attenuated if the first and
second presentations of the stimulus mismatch on some di
mension (e.g., different letter case for words or different exem
plars for objects). This attenuation of priming is referred to as
specificity. In a study of object recognition, Marsolek (1999)
reported distinct patterns of specificity in the two hemispheres.
Participants named objects (e.g., a piano) presented in either the
left visual field (right hemisphere) or the right visual field (left
hemisphere) after having viewed a series of centrally presented
objects during an initial encoding phase. Some of the test objects
were repetitions of the same exemplars seen during encoding,
and others had been preceded by different exemplars from the
same category (e.g., one exemplar of a piano during encoding
and a different exemplar of a piano during test). Equivalent
priming was obtained in the same and different exemplar
conditions when test objects were presented to the left hemi
sphere, but priming was reduced in the different exemplar
condition (a demonstration of specificity) when test objects were
presented to the right hemisphere. A similar pattern of right
hemisphere specificity was obtained when objects did or did not
vary in depth orientation (Burgund &Marsolek, 2000) and when
the objects used were unfamiliar or novel (Marsolek & Burgund,
2008).
There are reasons to believe that two dissociable neural
subsystems may underlie abstract and specific perception be
yond the visual domain. We recently obtained hemispheric
differences in talker specificity effects in spoken word recog
nition (Gonza´lez & McLennan, 2007), a finding analogous to
Marsolek and his colleagues’ findings of hemispheric differ
ences in letter case specificity effects in visual word recognition
(Burgund & Marsolek, 1997; Marsolek, 2004). Specifically, we
observed that the right hemisphere was more sensitive than the
left hemisphere to surface information associated with talker
identity. The question of interest in the study we report here is
whether this hemispheric asymmetry in auditory priming is
unique to linguistic stimuli, or whether it extends to nonlin
guistic stimuli. If the asymmetry does extend to nonlinguistic
stimuli, then it can be considered a general property of the au
ditory perceptual system, and we should obtain the same pattern
of results in the auditory recognition of environmental sounds as
in the auditory recognition of linguistic sounds.
Dichotic listening, neuropsychological, electrophysiological,
and neuroimaging studies have provided a great deal of evi
dence for auditory processing asymmetries (see Tervaniemi &
Hugdahl, 2003), and demonstrate that such asymmetries are not
limited to a single domain (e.g., language, music, environmental
sounds). However, no hemispheric distinction can account for
all the data (Sanders & Poeppel, 2007). In particular, classical
dichotic listening studies revealed an overall right ear advan
tage for processing some types of verbal stimuli and a left ear
advantage for processing prosody, some aspects of music, and
environmental sounds (Hugdahl, 1999); however, no study to
date has investigated the lateralization of specificity effects.
In the present study, we tested hemispheric asymmetries in
specificity by performing four long term repetition priming ex
periments in which the task was to identify environmental
sounds. An obvious prerequisite was demonstration that such
stimuli are subject to long term priming and specificity effects in
the first place. Some studies have reported priming for envi
ronmental sounds (Chiu, 2000; Chiu & Schacter, 1995; Stuart &
Jones, 1996), and one study obtained specificity effects (Chiu,
2000). In particular, Chiu observed exemplar specificity effects
in four repetition priming experiments in which participants
attempted to identify environmental sounds from their initial
sound stems or to identify environmental sounds embedded in
white noise. He found that priming was more robust when a
sound was repeated than when it was preceded by a different
exemplar from the same category. Our aim was to investigate
potential hemispheric differences in exemplar specificity effects
during the recognition of environmental sounds. We expected to
find a pattern similar to that reported by Marsolek (1999) in his
work on visual object recognition. In particular, we predicted
significantly better performance in sound recognition after
same exemplar priming than after different exemplar priming
when stimuli were presented to the right hemisphere, but not
when they were presented to the left hemisphere.
In each experiment, 24 (Experiments 1 and 2) or 30 (Exper
iments 3 and 4) participants of both sexes, recruited from the
University Jaume I, volunteered in return for course credit. All
participants were right handed (Edinburgh Handedness In
ventory; Oldfield, 1971) native speakers of Spanish with no re
ported history of speech or hearing disorders. No one
participated in more than one experiment.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Materials
The experimental stimuli consisted of 24 digitized target sounds
(see Table 1) that were selected from Marcell, Borella, Greene,
Kerr, and Rogers’s (2000) database as representing a variety of
everyday nonverbal acoustic events, such as sounds produced
by animals, people, musical instruments, tools, and other ob
jects. According to the normative data reported byMarcell et al.,
the mean naming accuracy for these sounds was 78%. Following
Shafiro and Gygi’s (2004) guidelines, we selected an additional
TABLE 1
Target Stimuli Used in the Experiments
Experiments 1 2: bagpipes, boat horn, chewing, child coughing,
church bells, coin dropping, cutting paper, drill, elephant, frying food,
gong, harmonica, helicopter, jackhammer, monkey, ocean, owl, pouring
water, thunder, toilet flushing, turning pages, violin, wind, yawning
Experiments 3 4: accordion, airplane, brushing teeth, cash register,
clapping, crumpling paper, donkey, dropping ice in a glass, flute,
gargling, guitar, harp, horse galloping, lion, organ, ping pong, police
siren, rattlesnake, snoring, train, typewriter, whistling, wolf, zipper
Note. These stimuli were obtained from Marcell, Borella, Greene, Kerr, and
Rogers (2000).
set of 24 digitized sounds from a variety of sound databases.
These sounds represented the same acoustic events as the target
set. Thus, we had two exemplars for each event. Both sets of
sounds were 16 bit WAV files saved at a sampling rate of 22,050
Hz. Durations of the sound files ranged from 1.1 to 5.9 s.
A different set of environmental sounds was used as filler
stimuli. All audio files were equated in root mean square
(RMS) amplitude. Auditory stems were created by digitally
truncating each target sound so that only the initial 750 ms
were preserved (Chiu, 2000, and Chiu & Schacter, 1995, used
the first 1,000 ms).
Design and Procedure
The design was similar to that of other long term repetition
priming experiments (Gonza´lez & McLennan, 2007; McLennan
& Luce, 2005; McLennan, Luce, & Charles Luce, 2003). Par
ticipants were seated in front of a computer and listened to
stimuli presented in two blocks. In the first block (the study
phase), 24 stimuli were presented binaurally in random order (8
same exemplar primes, 8 different exemplar primes, and 8
fillers). These stimuli were preceded and followed by 2 addi
tional fillers to minimize primacy and recency effects (Chiu,
2000). Participants were instructed to type the name of the
acoustic event represented by the sound in each trial. After a
short distractor task (performing arithmetic operations for 4 5
min), participants received the second block (the test phase).
During this block, they were instructed to identify target sounds
from their 750 ms sound stems. Stems were presented monau
rally in random order. Half the stems were presented to the left
ear, and half were presented to the right ear. Note that because
the majority of neural projections are contralateral, a stimulus
presented to the right ear should be processedmore efficiently in
the left than in the right hemisphere, and a stimulus presented to
the left ear should be processed more efficiently in the right than
in the left hemisphere. Of the 24 sound stems presented in the
test phase, 8 were primed by a same exemplar sound in the study
phase, 8 were primed by a different exemplar sound in the study
phase, and 8 were unprimed (the control condition).
The experiment was conducted on a Pentium PC computer,
using Inquisit 1.33 software, and stimuli were presented over
calibrated headphones (AKG K55; Vienna, Austria) at 70 dB in
a quiet room. Examples of possible correct responses were given
during three preliminary practice trials, but not during the study
or test phases.
The experimental design was an orthogonal combination of
three levels of prime type (same exemplar, different exemplar,
and control) and two levels of ear of target stem presentation
(left and right). Table 2 summarizes the six within participants
conditions. Six stimulus lists were created to ensure that each
target stem was assigned to every possible condition across
participants. No participant heard more than one version of a
given sound within a block.
Results
Responses in the test phase were scored according to the
guidelines for scoring naming responses outlined by Marcell
et al. (2000, pp. 836 842). Figure 1 displays themean proportion
of naming accuracy as a function of prime type and ear of target
stem presentation. Separate analyses were carried out with par
ticipants (F1, t1) and items (F2, t2) as the random variable.
Accuracy was analyzed in a two way repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with prime type (same exemplar,
different exemplar, or unprimed control) and ear of target stem
presentation (left or right) as within participants factors.
Planned comparisons were performed to examine any possible
difference between the same exemplar and different exemplar
conditions for each ear (hemisphere). We observed a significant
main effect of prime type, F1(2, 46) 5 10.20, MSE 5 0.038,
TABLE 2
Experimental Conditions in the Four Experiments
Condition Block 1: prime Block 2: target
Same exemplar bagpipeA bagpipeA
Different exemplar bagpipeB bagpipeA
Control duck bagpipeA
Note. The conditions are illustrated by examples of stimuli used in Experi-
ments 1 and 2. Subscripts identify different exemplars of the same sound
event. Complete sound files were presented binaurally during Block 1, and
truncated versions (target stems) were presented monaurally in Block 2. The
target stems were presented to the right ear on half the trials and to the left ear
on the other half.
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Fig. 1. Mean proportion of naming accuracy in Experiment 1 as a
function of prime type and ear of target-stem presentation. Error bars
indicate standard errors of the means.
Zp
2 ¼ :31; F2(2, 46) 5 10.20, MSE 5 0.038, Zp2 ¼ :31. No
other significant effect was obtained. Post hoc analyses revealed
significant differences between the same exemplar and control
conditions, and between the same exemplar and different
exemplar conditions.
Crucially, planned comparisons demonstrated that the differ
ence between the same exemplar and different exemplar con
ditions (Ms5 .64 and .57, respectively) was not significant when
the target stems were presented to the right ear (both ts< 1), but
was significant (Ms 5 .67 and .50) when the target stems
were presented to the left ear, t1(23)5 3.56, p< .003, prep5 .99,
d 5 0.73; t2(23) 5 3.56, p < .003, prep5 .99, d 5 0.73.
Discussion
These results are consistent with our predictions based on
Marsolek’s (1999, 2003) results in the visual domain. In par
ticular, exemplar specificity effects emerged when the target
stimuli were presented to the left ear (right hemisphere), but not
when the target stimuli were presented to the right ear (left
hemisphere).
EXPERIMENT 2
In an attempt to minimize the involvement of the hemisphere on
the same side as the ear receiving the target stimuli (via ipsi
lateral projections), in Experiment 2 we presented noise to the
ear not receiving each auditory target stem. Presenting infor
mation to the two hemispheres simultaneously would be ex
pected to increase competition between the hemispheres and to
increase the likelihood of observing hemispheric asymmetries
(Fecteau, Enns, & Kingstone, 2000; Gonza´lez & McLennan,
2007; Kimura, 1961).
Method
The materials, design, and procedure were all identical to those
of Experiment 1, with the following exceptions: A 750 ms audio
file containing white noise was created; the noise was low pass
filtered at 11,025 Hz and digitized at a sampling rate of 22,050
Hz, and the RMS amplitude was set to 5 dB below the level of the
sound files. During each trial in the test phase, a sound stem was
presented in one ear, and the noise was presented simulta
neously in the opposite ear.
Results
Figure 2 displays the mean proportion of naming accuracy as a
function of prime type and ear of target stem presentation. As
expected, overall performance was lower than in Experiment 1
because of the noise’s masking effect. We observed a significant
main effect of prime type, F1(2, 46) 5 25.87, MSE 5 0.052,
Zp
2 ¼ :53; F2(2, 46) 5 19.67, MSE 5 0.068, Zp2 ¼ :46. Post
hoc analyses revealed significant differences among the three
priming conditions.
Crucially, planned comparisons demonstrated that the
difference between the same exemplar and different exemplar
conditions (Ms 5 .60 and .58, respectively) was not significant
when the target stems were presented to the right ear (both ts<
1), but was significant (Ms5 .66 and .46) when the target stems
were presented to the left ear, t1(23)5 2.74, p< .02, prep5 .91,
d 5 0.56; t2(23) 5 2.74, p < .02, prep 5 .91, d 5 0.56.
Discussion
Once again, the results are consistent with our predictions based on
Marsolek’s (1999, 2003) results in the visual domain. In particular,
exemplar specificity effects emerged when the target stimuli were
presented to the left ear (right hemisphere), but not when the target
stimuli were presented to the right ear (left hemisphere).
In order to test the generalizability of the pattern of results, we
planned two additional experiments that used a new set of
stimuli and a new task during the study phase (i.e., different
study and test tasks). An advantage of using different tasks
during the two phases was that this minimized the likelihood that
simple, rapid stimulus response learning was responsible for
any priming effects observed (Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, &
Schacter, 2004).
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
The method in Experiment 3 was identical to that in Experiment
1, with two exceptions. First, from the Marcell et al. (2000)
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Fig. 2. Mean proportion of naming accuracy in Experiment 2 as a
function of prime type and ear of target-stem presentation. Error bars
indicate standard errors of the means.
database, we selected a new set of 24 digitized target sounds
representing a new set of acoustic events (see Table 1). Ac
cording to the normative data reported by Marcell et al., the
mean naming accuracy for these sounds was 80%. Following
Shafiro and Gygi’s (2004) guidelines, we selected from a variety
of sound databases an additional set of 24 digitized sounds
representing the same acoustic events as the target set. Dura
tions of the sound files ranged from 1.2 to 5.9 s. Second, during
the study block, a pleasantness rating task was used. Partici
pants were instructed to rate each sound for ‘‘pleasantness’’ on a
scale from 1 (unpleasant) to 4 (pleasant). This task has been used
in other long term priming experiments during the study phase
(Gonza´lez & McLennan, 2007; Schacter & Church, 1992).
Results
Figure 3 displays the mean proportion of naming accuracy as a
function of prime type and ear of target stem presentation. We
observed a significant main effect of prime type, F1(2, 58) 5
6.20,MSE5 0.041,Zp
2 ¼ :18;F2(2, 46)5 4.63,MSE5 0.043,
Zp
2 ¼ :17. No other significant effect was obtained. Post hoc
analyses revealed significant differences between the same
exemplar and control conditions, and between the same exem
plar and different exemplar conditions.
Crucially, planned comparisons demonstrated that the differ
ence between the same exemplar and different exemplar con
ditions (Ms5 .56 and .52, respectively) was not significant when
the target stems were presented to the right ear (both ts < 1),
but was significant (Ms5 .62 and .48) when the target stemswere
presented to the left ear, t1(29)5 2.29, p < .04, prep5 .88, d5
0.42; t2(29) 5 2.43, p < .03, prep5 .96, d 5 0.50.
Discussion
Our data showed the same pattern as in the previous experi
ments: Exemplar specificity emerged when the target stimuli
were presented to the left ear (right hemisphere), but not when
the target stimuli were presented to the right ear (left hemi
sphere).
EXPERIMENT 4
In Experiment 4, we attempted to replicate the results of Ex
periment 3, this time presenting noise to the ear not receiving
the auditory target stem.
Method
The method in Experiment 4 was identical to that in Experiment
3, except that during each trial in the test phase, a sound stem
was presented in one ear, and noise (the same audio file created
in Experiment 2) was presented in the opposite ear.
Results and Discussion
Figure 4 displays the mean proportion of naming accuracy as a
function of prime type and ear of target stem presentation. As
expected, overall performance was lower than in Experiment 3
because of the noise’s masking effect. Again, we obtained a
significant main effect of prime type, F1(2, 58)5 5.63, MSE5
0.067, Zp
2 ¼ :16; F2(2, 46) 5 9.62, MSE 5 0.031, Zp2 ¼ :30.
Post hoc analyses revealed significant differences between the
same exemplar and control conditions, and between the differ
ent exemplar and control conditions. Unlike in the previous
experiments, we also observed a significant main effect of ear of
target stem presentation; the sound stems administered to the
left ear (right hemisphere) were recognized better than the sound
stems administered to the right ear (left hemisphere; Ms 5 .45
and .35, respectively), F1(1, 29) 5 5.97, MSE 5 0.084,
Zp
2 ¼ :17; F2(1, 23) 5 15.07, MSE 5 0.027, Zp2 ¼ :40.
Planned comparisons demonstrated that the difference be
tween the same exemplar and different exemplar conditions
(Ms 5 .41 and .39, respectively) was not significant when the
target stems were presented to the right ear (both ts < 1). The
difference between these conditions was larger (Ms 5 .53 and
.45) when the target stems were presented to the left ear, al
though it was not significant across participants, t1(29) 5 1.27,
p 5 .213, prep 5 .75, d 5 0.23, and reached only marginal
significance across items, t2(29) 5 1.81, p 5 .083, prep 5 .97,
d 5 0.37.
It is important to note that overall performance was signifi
cantly lower in this experiment (M5 .40) than in Experiments 1
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Fig. 3. Mean proportion of naming accuracy in Experiment 3 as a
function of prime type and ear of target-stem presentation. Error bars
indicate standard errors of the means.
through 3 (Ms5 .55, .48, and .51, respectively; all ps< .01). It
is possible that the reduction in overall performance decreased
the opportunity to observe specificity and, consequently, effects
of hemispheric asymmetry. Nevertheless, although specificity in
the right hemisphere was only marginally significant, the pattern
of results was consistent with the pattern observed in the pre
vious experiments (i.e., greater specificity in the right than in the
left hemisphere).
Low overall performance due to demanding conditions (dif
ferent study and test tasks, masking noise) may have favored the
emergence of the general left ear advantage observed in earlier
studies on the identification of environmental sounds. Those
studies used dichotic listening tasks, which are presumably
more demanding than monaural tasks (Curry, 1967; Knox &
Kimura, 1970).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We tested whether specificity effects would be obtained when
environmental sounds were presented to the left ear (right
hemisphere), but not when they were presented to the right ear
(left hemisphere). In four long term priming experiments, we
observed specificity effects (an advantage for same exemplar
priming relative to different exemplar priming) when target
stems were presented to the left ear (right hemisphere), but not
when they were presented to the right ear (left hemisphere). This
pattern was consistent, emerging when the study and test tasks
were the same (Experiments 1 and 2) and when they were
different (Experiments 3 and 4), when noise was presented to the
opposite ear (Experiments 2 and 4) and when it was not (Ex
periments 1 and 3), and when either of two sets of stimuli was
used (Experiments 1 and 2 vs. 3 and 4).
The pattern of our data is analogous to the pattern observed in
visual object recognition. Given the similarity of our current
results on the recognition of acoustic events, our previous results
on spoken word recognition (Gonza´lez & McLennan, 2007), and
Marsolek and his colleagues’ results (Burgund & Marsolek,
1997, 2000; Marsolek, 1999, 2004) on visual object and visual
word recognition, we suggest that the pattern is not specific to
any particular sensory modality, but rather reflects a more
general property of the human perceptual processing system.
According to the dissociable subsystems theory, an abstract
category subsystem operates more effectively in the left than in
the right hemisphere and is less sensitive to the specific surface
characteristics of stimuli, whereas a specific exemplar subsys
tem operates more effectively in the right than in the left
hemisphere and is more sensitive to specific stimulus charac
teristics. That is, each subsystem is more efficient at a different
type of processing: Analytic (features based) processing that
does not include specific stimulus characteristics may charac
terize the computations of the former subsystem, and holistic
(whole based) processing that includes specific stimulus char
acteristics may characterize the computations of the latter
(Marsolek, 1999).
Some authors have suggested that the widespread existence of
specificity effects in several domains implies that specificity has
an adaptive value and might be associated with some type of
cognitive resource conservation (Schacter, Dobbins, & Schnyer,
2004). In a continuously changing environment, it is important
to categorize the objects and events in one’s surroundings in both
abstract and specific terms, and this requirement is not exclu
sive to any one sensory modality. This dual categorization
implies opposing capabilities. Computational reasoning and
hemispheric asymmetries suggest that the human brain may
perform dual categorization better by means of two dissociable
subsystems than by means of a single, undifferentiated system
(see Marsolek, 2003). Each of the two theorized parallel neural
subsystems, or processing styles, operates more effectively
although not exclusively in a different hemisphere and may
obey a general processing principle that transcends particular
modalities. Several neuroimaging studies of auditory and visual
priming have shown reduction of activity in cortical areas in
volved in multimodal functions (Buckner, Koutstaal, Schacter,
&Rosen, 2000; Carlesimo et al., 2004; for a review, see Schacter
et al., 2004).
In recent years, research has suggested that certain charac
teristics of specific processing systems can be integrated into
more general principles. For example, the distinction between
local and global processing was initially confined to the visual
domain. Data suggested a hemispheric specialization: Global (or
low spatial frequency) information was preferentially processed
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Fig. 4. Mean proportion of naming accuracy in Experiment 4 as a
function of prime type and ear of target-stem presentation. Error bars
indicate standard errors of the means.
in the right hemisphere, and local (or high spatial frequency)
information was preferentially processed in the left hemisphere
(Sanders & Poeppel, 2007). New data from the auditory domain
are consistent with the same general pattern: Relatively slow
auditory changes (200 300 ms) are preferentially processed in
the right hemisphere, whereas relatively fast changes (25 50
ms) are preferentially processed in the left hemisphere (see
Boemio, Fromm, Braun, & Poeppel, 2005).1 Given the conver
gence of data across modalities, the local global distinction may
define a general organizational principle that is compatible
with the dissociable subsystems (analytic, holistic) account of
lateralization.
The asymmetrical pattern of auditory specificity for word and
environmental sound perception should be considered in the
more general framework of lateralization of auditory cortex
functions. Evidence from behavioral dichotic listening studies
and more recent data from positron emission tomography,
magnetoencephalography, and functional magnetic resonance
imaging research suggest that a parameter model (rapid vs. slow
temporal or frequency changes) provides a better account of
hemispheric differences than the classical domain (e.g., speech
vs. music)model (Tervaniemi&Hugdahl, 2003). The existence of
two subsystems with two different processing styles would fit well
with this newer conceptualization of auditory lateralization.
Finally, the possibility that the dissociable subsystems frame
work characterizes perceptual and memory processing in
multiple modalities suggests directions for future work. For
example, behavioral, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging
studies could examine potential priming asymmetries in other
auditory subdomains, including music perception, voice rec
ognition, and pseudoword processing. Also, it would be of in
terest to examine asymmetries using synthetic and novel sound
stimuli, given the recent hemispheric asymmetries Marsolek
and Burgund (2008) observed using novel visual stimuli in a
workingmemory task. Finally, research could extend to the three
remaining sensory modalities (touch, taste, and smell). For ex
ample, it is an interesting question whether specificity in tactile
recognition is greater when objects are handled with the left
hand (right hemisphere) than when they are handled with the
right hand (left hemisphere).
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